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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ryan Alan Forbes asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress,
because he made incriminating statements to a polygraph examiner and a police officer in a
"classic penalty" situation, in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Mr. Forbes also asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to dismiss the indictment against him, because the prosecutor committed misconduct so
egregious as to require dismissal by presenting illegal evidence to the grand jury.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court's findings of fact on the motion to suppress, one evening
Mr. Forbes and Cathryn Mason were at the home of Mr. Forbes' parents, where Mr. Forbes
lived. (See R., p.620.) Post Falls Police Department Officers Flood and Browne, along with
emergency medical personnel, arrived at the home in response to a request for emergency
assistance for Ms. Mason. (R., p.620.) She was unconscious and unresponsive. (R., p.620.)
Mr. Forbes had been performing CPR on Ms. Mason, but the emergency responders took
over. (R., pp.620-21.) Per the district court's findings of fact regarding the motion to dismiss
the indictment, Officer Flood testified he saw Mr. Forbes performing chest compressions on an
unconscious Ms. Mason, and Mr. Forbes stated he had engaged in rescue breathing on her before
the officer's arrival. (See R., p.635.) Officer Flood testified he took over the chest compressions
before the medical personnel took over, and once the medical personnel arrived, Mr. Forbes did
not seem very interested in what was happening. (R., pp.636-37.)
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The officers searched Mr. Forbes' room after he consented, finding a baggie of
methamphetamine and medical supplies. (R., p.621.) He told the officers that Ms. Mason had
arrived in his room intoxicated, had fallen asleep, and could not be awakened. (R., p.621.)
The next day, Mr. Forbes was arrested for the methamphetamine found in his room.
(R., p.621.) Post Falls Police Detective McDonald asked him if he would take a polygraph
examination, and Mr. Forbes said yes, if requested. (R., p.621.) The State later charged him
with possession of methamphetamine in Kootenai County CR 2014-9159. (R., p.621.)
Ms. Mason died the day after Mr. Forbes' arrest, from what was determined to be a
heroin overdose. (R., p.621.) John Howard, M.D., a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy
on Ms. Mason a few days later. (R., p.637.)
Detective McDonald testified at an evidentiary hearing that he had accessed Ms. Mason's
cell phone and saw indications that she had used heroin before she met Mr. Forbes. (R., p.635.)
Post Falls Detective Goodwin testified that he had searched Ms. Mason's car, and found syringes
and a baggie of heroin. (R., p.635.) He also found drug paraphernalia in the room where
Ms. Mason had been staying at her grandmother's house, and the grandmother believed she had
seen certain physical changes in Ms. Mason in the few months before her death. (R., p.635.)
Mr. Forbes was charged in a separate Benewah County case with stealing the medical
supplies found in his room. (R., p.621.) The possession of methamphetamine charge was
dismissed, but the State subsequently refiled the charge in Kootenai County CR 2014-13139.
(R., p.621.) The State also charged Mr. Forbes with two counts of burglary, relating to items
Mr. Forbes had pawned, in Kootenai County No. CR 2014-21999. (R., p.621.)
Mr. Forbes ultimately pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and one count of
burglary.

(R., p.621.)

At Mr. Forbes' sentencing hearing, Ms. Mason's mother, Cynthia
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Cannack, testified about Ms. Mason's death. (R., p.621.) The district court imposed a prison
sentence and retained jurisdiction. (R., p.621.)
Several months later, Post Falls Police Detective Dave Beck called Mr. Forbes while he
was on his "rider," and asked if Mr. Forbes would speak with him about Ms. Mason's death.
(R., p.622.) Mr. Forbes stated he would not do so without his lawyer. (R., p.622.) The district
court subsequently placed Mr. Forbes on probation. (R., p.622.)
About five months into Mr. Forbes' probation, the State filed a report of probation
violation against him. (See R., p.622.) .Mr. Forbes admitted the violation and was released from
jail, on the condition that he attend the Good Samaritan Rehabilitation program. (R., p.622.)
The district court delayed the probation violation disposition, "presumably to see how he
performed in the" program. (R., p.622.)
Meanwhile, Post Falls Police investigators took steps to have Mr. Forbes undergo a
polygraph examination regarding Ms. Mason's death. (R., p.622.) Detective McDonald emailed
Mr. Forbes' probation officer, Clinton Blettner, asking about arranging a polygraph examination.
(R., p.622.) Detective McDonald then advised Officer Blettner a polygraph was scheduled at the
office of Ted Pulver. (R., p.622.) Officer Blettner responded that someone from the Good
Samaritan program would take Mr. Forbes to the appointment. (R., p.622.) Detective McDonald
went through Mr. Forbes' probation officer "on the belief that a condition of Defendant's
probation was cooperation with law enforcement." (R., p.622.)
Officer Blettner later sent a message to Detective McDonald stating that he had earlier, at
a church service, told Mr. Forbes about the polygraph appointment, and Mr. Forbes "had asked if
he had to do it." (R., p.622.) The district court found, "Blettner said he told Defendant if he told
Defendant to take a polygraph examination that Defendant would have to do so since he was on
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felony probation and a condition of that probation included ta1cing polygraph examinations."

(R., pp.622-23.) A condition of Mr. Forbes' probation was that he ''submit to a polygraph
examination at the request of his probation officer." (R., p.623.) Officer Blettner told Detective
McDonald that Mr. Forbes did not seem eager to ta1ce the polygraph. (R., p.623.)
Officer Blettner's notes indicated that he "instructed" Mr. Forbes to ta1ce the polygraph,
but the officer later testified that he really meant "informed." (R., p.623.) Officer Blettner
testified before a grand jury that he told Mr. Forbes to ta1ce the polygraph, but did not tell him it
was mandatory. (R., p.623.) According to the officer, he did not order Mr. Forbes to ta1ce the
polygraph, but told him it was going to happen. (R., p.623.) The district court found that Officer
Blettner "has also said he never threatened Defendant with a polygraph violation should
Defendant refuse to ta1ce the polygraph, and that it was never his intention to seek to have
Defendant's probation violated with respect to any polygraph refusal." (R., p.623.)
Steven Hemming, a facilitator with the Good Samaritan program, drove Mr. Forbes to the
polygraph appointment at Mr. Pulver's office. (R., p.623.) Mr. Hemming believed Mr. Forbes'
probation officer had ordered Mr. Forbes to ta1ce the polygraph examination, and told Mr. Forbes
of his belief. (R., p.623.) He encouraged Mr. Forbes to be honest. (R., p.623.) Mr. Forbes did
not want to take the polygraph, but Mr. Hemming advised him this was an opportunity from God
for him to release himself from the burden of Ms. Mason's death. (R., p.623.)
The district court found: "Polygrapher Ted Pulver has testified he conducted a pre-test
interview with Defendant during which Defendant allegedly made incriminating statements
about Mason's death. Pulver advised Sgt. Beck of those statements." (R., p.623.) Detective
Beck then spoke with Mr. Forbes over the phone, and arranged to pick him up from Mr. Pulver' s
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office for a further interview at the Post Falls Police Department. (R., pp.623-24.) Mr. Pulver
testified that Mr. Forbes agreed to speak with Detective Beck. (R., p.624.)
Detective Beck testified that during the drive to the police station, Mr. Forbes was not
under arrest, and the detective made no promises or threats to him. (R., p.624.) At the station,
Mr. Forbes signed a Miranda rights acknowledgement and waiver form.

(R., p.624.) The

district court found, "Beck has stated that during the interview Defendant had admitted to
injecting Mason with heroin, and when Mason became unconscious he used the same syringe to
inject Narcan in an effort to revive her." (R., p.624.) Mr. Forbes asked Detective Beck if the
interview had been done to prosecute him, and the detective stated it was done to try to get some
answers for Ms. Mason's mother. (R., p.624.)
After the interview, Mr. Forbes left the police station with Mr. Hemming. (R., p.624.)
Mr. Hemming stated that, when he picked up Mr. Forbes, Mr. Forbes seemed happy and upbeat
or light hearted. (R., p.624.) Mr. Forbes told Mr. Hemming he had been honest with the police,
he had talked about Ms. Mason's overdose, the heroin was hers and not his, and he had helped
her to administer it. (R., p.624.) At a grand jury, Mr. Hemming testified that Mr. Forbes had
admitted to administering the heroin to Ms. Mason. (R., p.624.)
Ms. Carmack, now going by the last name Schaffner, stated that she met Mr. Forbes at
their church a couple years after Ms. Mason's death. (R., p.624.) After the appointment with
Mr. Pulver, Ms. Carmack asked Mr. Forbes to sit with her at church. (See R., pp.624-25.) The
district court found, "Carmack has denied being an agent of the police, or having been asked by
the police to gather information from Defendant." (R., p.625.) Ms. Carmack knew about the
plans for the polygraph, but told Mr. Forbes she had not been talking with the police.
(R., p.625.) However, the district court found "she had several discussions with the police about
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the statute of the investigation, and had told the police about having met Defendant at church and
one time outside the courthouse in Coeur d'Alene." (R., p.625.)
Mr. Forbes told Ms. Carmack he had told the polygrapher and police that he had given
Ms. Mason the drugs that led to her death. (R., p.625.) He explained he had injected Ms. Mason
with heroin and tried to revive her with Narcan. (R., p.625.) They also talked about forgiveness,
accountability, and Mr. Forbes' recovery program with Good Samaritan. (R., p.625.) The
district court subsequently fonnally reinstated Mr. Forbes' probation, because of his good
perfonnance in his rehabilitation program. (R., p.625.)
About a year later, a Kootenai County grand jury returned an Indictment charging
Mr. Forbes with second degree murder and delivery of a controlled substance. (Conf. Exs., pp.1 2; see R., p.625.) Ms. Carmack testified before the grand jury, and the district court found that,
by that time, she had learned that Ms. Mason had been involved in illegal drug use. (R., p.635.)
She testified that, at the time of Ms. Mason's death, she knew nothing about Ms. Mason using
drugs. (R., p.635.) Ms. Carmack had learned from Detective McDonald that Mr. Forbes had
admitted using the same syringe to administer heroin and then Narcan to Ms. Mason. (See
R., p.635.) However, the district court found that Ms. Carmack "told the grand jury she did not

know Mason to use drugs and had seen no signs of drug use in her." (R., p.637.)
Dr. Howard also testified before the grand jury, stating that Ms. Mason died of heroin
toxicity that caused cardiorespiratory arrest and subsequent brain damage and death.

(See

R., p.637.) Dr. Howard testified he did not find any needle track marks indicative of frequent IV
use of heroin. (R., p.63 7.) He stated any evidence of someone injecting heroin for the first time
could have been obscured by hospital injections, but he saw no evidence Ms. Mason had been
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using drugs over a period of time. (R., p.637.) Dr. Howard agreed that hospital injections could
mask an injection site on a new user. (R., p.637.)
In his testimony before the grand jury, Detective Beck stated Mr. Forbes had told him
that Ms. Mason had claimed to use heroin intravenously before using with him, and he had used
heroin with Ms. Mason one other time prior to the day she died.

(R., p.637.)

Detective

McDonald testified that Mr. Forbes had told him Ms. Mason had used opiates before her death,
but not in his presence. (R., p.637.)
Mr. Forbes filed various motions, including a Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.237-39.)
Among the issues raised in the motion to suppress, Mr. Forbes asserted the evidence gathered
against him after probation officers ordered him to take a polygraph interrogation related to the
death of Ms. Mason must be suppressed, because the polygraph interrogation was unlawful and
produced involuntary statements in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., p.237.)
Mr. Forbes had previously filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress.
(R., pp.87-117.) On the Fifth Amendment claim, he asserted: "In this case, the police used
Ryan's probation to get him to participate in a polygraph and elicit incriminating statements.
Mr. Hemming and others verified that Ryan only participated because he believed he was
required to as part of his probation. Thus, the police put Ryan in the classic penalty situation."

(R., p.106.)
Mr. Forbes also filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment and Memorandum in Support.
(R., pp.181-94.) The motion to dismiss the indictment was brought "pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 6.6, on the grounds that the Indictment was not properly found, endorsed and presented as
required by these rules or by the statutes of the state of Idaho." (R., p.181.) Mr. Forbes asserted
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"the grand jury did not receive legally sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
and even if such legally sufficient evidence was presented, prosecutorial misconduct in
submitting illegal evidence and failing to introduce evidence negating Mr. Forbes' guilty was so
egregious as to be prejudicial. (R., p.181.)
On the prosecutorial misconduct claim, Mr. Forbes asserted, "In this case, prosecutors
abused the indictment procedure by allowing inadmissible evidence to be introduced and by
failing to disclose evidence within the State's possession that would substantially negate the guilt
of the subject of the investigation." (R., p.186.) Among the claims of prosecutorial misconduct,
he asserted his confession should not have been presented to the grand jury, because his
statements to Mr. Pulver were in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (R., p.187.)
Mr. Forbes also asserted the testimony of Ms. Carmack was deliberately inflammatory,
argumentative, and illegal. (R., p.189.) He asserted that, "From the beginning, Ms. Carmack
turned every question into an emotional appeal to the jurors." (R., p.189.) Moreover, "on at
least one occasion Ms. Carmack blatantly lied to the jury, a fact easily detected by the state if not
known to them as she perjured herself." (R., p.191.) While Ms. Carmack testified that she had
spent time with her daughter prior to her death and there were no signs Ms. Mason was using
drugs, Ms. Carmack and her daughter were actually estranged at the time. (See R., p.191.)
Additionally, Mr. Forbes filed a Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Corrupted
Investigation and Bad Faith. {R., pp.392-401.) The district court subsequently conducted an
evidentiary hearing. (See generally Tr. 07/12/18; Tr. 07/13/18.)
At a later hearing, with respect to the motion to suppress, Mr. Forbes asserted, "[Y]ou
can't have a probationer believe that they have to cooperate, do a polygraph, talk to the police,
provide new information on an investigation, or they'll have a probation violation."
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(Tr. 08/03/18, p.21, Ls.1-6.) On the motion to dismiss the indictment, Mr. Forbes asserted there
was a lot of speculation allowed with respect to Ms. Carmack's testimony. (See Tr. 08/03/18,
p.59, Ls.5-6.) The State allowed Ms. Carmack to testify before the grand jury that she did not
know Ms. Mason to use drugs. (See Tr. 08/03/18, p.59, Ls.6-23.) The State, however, had a
duty to correct inaccurate testimony. (See Tr. 08/03/18, p.61, Ls.1-2.)
The district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion to
Suppress. (R., pp.620-33.) On the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
issue, the district court determined the State did not compel Mr. Forbes to make any statements
to Mr. Pulver or Detective Beck. (R., p.629.) Per the district court, "Notwithstanding some
inconsistency in language used by Blettner, this Court finds that he did no more than arrange for
the polygraph at the request of law enforcement, arrange for Defendant to get a ride to that
appointment, and then accurately answer Defendant's questions about the polygraph."
(R., p.629.) The district court determined Officer Blettner "did not order Defendant to submit to
the polygraph, nor did he threaten him with a sanction if Defendant refused." (R., p.629.) The
district court also determined Mr. Forbes "never invoked his Fifth Amendment right, rather, he
appeared to follow Mr. Hemming's moral advice to unburden himself of the story surrounding
Mason's death." (R., p.629.) The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.632.)
The district court also issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.634-43.) This memorandum decision covered both the motion to
dismiss the indictment, and the corrupted investigation and bad faith motion to dismiss. (See
R., p.637.) The district court denied that latter motion to dismiss. (See R., p.638.)
On the motion to dismiss the indictment, the district court determined that Dr. Howard
did not conclude that Ms. Mason was a new drug user, but only stated her body lacked evidence
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of needle track marks. (See R., p.641.) The district court determined: ''Carmack's testimony
was more problematical. It appears to the Court that her testimony clearly implied her belief that
Mason was not a prior drug user, despite the fact that other evidence establishes that Carmack
knew otherwise."

(R., p.641.)

However, the district court determined that evidence was

"immaterial." (R., p.641.) According to the district court: "Dr. Howard did not offer testimony
that Mason died of an overdose because she was new to drug use[], only that she died of the
effects of heroin toxicity. Further, both Flood and McDonald testified that Defendant told them
he believed Mason was a heroin user." (R., p.641.) The district court determined: "It is entirely
immaterial whether Mason was a prior drug user. The grand jurors heard evidence that she was,
and her mother's implied belief that she was not. Neither inference matters." (R., p.641.)
Additionally, the district court determined that, because "the State did not violate
Defendant's constitutional right to counsel and right to be free from compelled self incrimination
in the manner they obtained" the statements to Mr. Pulver and Detective Beck, "there is no
prejudice in the introduction of that evidence to the grand jury." (R., p.641.)
In sum, the district court "conclude[d] that some inadmissible evidence was submitted to
the grand jury, but the conclusion, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, is that the
prosecution did not engage in misconduct in its presentation to the grand jury." (R., p.642.) The
district court determined, "The presenting prosecutors may have been a little more relaxed than
what is expected in their vigilance about presenting inaccurate information, but this Court
concludes Defendant was not prejudiced by any inaccuracy." (R., p.642.) The district court
specifically determined "that even if the grand jury had clearly heard that Mason brought the
heroin to the scene of her death, or that she had been using prior to that day, the evidence would
still have supported that the prosecution introduced substantial evidence on each element of the
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charged offenses, and Defendant would still have been indicted." (R., p.642.) The district court
denied the motions to dismiss. (See R., p.642.)
Under a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Forbes agreed to plead guilty by way of an

Alford1 plea to an amended charge of involuntary manslaughter. (See R., pp.645-48.) His
conditional plea reserved "the right to appeal this Court's ... denials of the Defendant's Motions
to Suppress and Dismiss; and the ... denials of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on Double
Jeopardy and Array of Grand Jurors."2 (R., p.647.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, to be
served concurrently with the sentences imposed in Mr. Forbes' other cases. (R., pp.658-60.)
Mr. Forbes filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment. (R., pp.661-69.)

1 North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
On appeal, Mr. Forbes has decided to waive any issues related to the double jeopardy motion to
dismiss or the biased grand jury motion to dismiss.
2
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ISSUES

I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Forbes' motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Forbes' motion to dismiss
the indictment?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Forbes's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Forbes asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. The

district court determined the State did not compel Mr. Forbes to make any statements to
Mr. Pulver and Detective Beck. (R., p.629.) According to the district court, "The circumstances
of those statements did not violate his Fifth Amendment right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination." (R., p.632.) However, Mr. Forbes' incriminating statements to Mr. Pulver and
Detective Beck were made in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled selfincrimination. Thus, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Forbes' motion to suppress on
the Fifth Amendment privilege issue.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Moore, 164

Idaho 379, 381 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court has held,
"When we review an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's
factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are
supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).
"Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Moore, 164 Idaho at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4

'Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and
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factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court." Bishop, 146
Idaho at 810. The appellate court "freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to
the facts as found." Moore, 164 Idaho at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).

C.

Mr. Forbes' Incriminating Statements To Mr. Pulver And Detective Beck Were Made In
Violation Of Mr. Forbes' Fifth Amendment Right Against Compelled Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no person "shall

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. The
Fourteenth Amendment guards this privilege against compulsory self-incrimination from
abridgement by the States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). The Fifth Amendment "not
only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a
criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him
in future criminal proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). Further, "A
defendant does not lose this protection by reason of his conviction of a crime; notwithstanding
that a defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating statements, if
those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than
that for which he has been convicted." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984).
Here, Mr. Forbes did not affirmatively assert his Fifth Amendment privilege or refuse to
answer the questions of Mr. Pulver or Detective Beck.

Instead, Mr. Forbes answered the

questions given to him during the polygraph interrogation and later interview at the police
station. (See R., pp.623-24.) The Fifth Amendment "does not preclude a witness from testifying
voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him"; generally, if one "desires the protection of
the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' within the

14

meaning of the Amendment." See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943). The
United States Supreme Court has also held that, "in the ordinary case, if a witness under
compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not
'compelled' him to incriminate himself." Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976).
However, in some narrowly defined situations, "incriminatory disclosures have been
considered compelled despite a failure to claim the privilege," where some factor "was held to
deny the individual a 'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer."' See id. at 656-57
(quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)). One such situation is the "classic
penalty" situation, "where the assertion of the privilege is penalized so as to 'foreclos[e] a free
choice to remain silent, and .. . compe[I] ... incriminating testimony."' See Murphy, 465 U.S.
at 434-35 (quoting Garner, 424 U.S. at 661). In such cases, "the state not only compelled an
individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment
privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions 'capable of forcing the selfincrimination which the Amendment forbids."' Id. at 434 (quoting Lefkowitz, 43 l U.S. at 806).
United States Supreme Court precedent has established "that certain types of penalties are
capable of coercing incriminating testimony: termination of employment, the loss of a
professional license, ineligibility to receive government contract, and the right to participate in
political associations and to hold public office." McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49-50 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). In contrast, in McKune itself, a
plurality of the Court held that a treatment program requiring a prisoner convicted of sex
offenses to complete a sexual history form detailing uncharged sexual offenses and all other prior
sexual activities did not violate the prisoner's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

]5

incrimination, even if refusal to participate would result in a move to maximum-security housing
and loss of other privileges. See id at 48 (plurality); id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The plurality in McKune held the program "serves a vital penological purpose, and
offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled selfincrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment." Id at 29 (plurality). Justice O'Connor,
concurring in the judgment, agreed with the dissenting justices on the proper standard, but did
not believe that the alterations in the prisoner's prison conditions because of his failure to
participate in the program "were so great as to constitute compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." See id. at 48-49 (O'Connor, concurring). The
four dissenting justices opined that the State's order for the prisoner to incriminate himself or
lose his medium-security status, combined with the threatened revocation of other privileges,
violated the prisoner's Fifth Amendment rights. Id at 56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Idaho Supreme Court, after examining McKune, noted "the opinions of O'Connor
and the four dissenters would hold that any penalty for asserting the right to remain silent that
was likely to compel an incriminating statement violates the Fifth Amendment." Slate v. Van

Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 539-40 (2016). The Van Komen Court held that, where the district court
"in its own words relinquished jurisdiction solely because Defendant refused to waive his Fifth
Amendment right and answer questions that could incriminate him and result in new felony
charges," the court's action "violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights." Id. at 540.
In the specific context of probation, the United States Supreme Court in Murphy has
explained:
The threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege distinguishes cases of this
sort from the ordinary case in which a witness is merely required to appear and
give testimony. A state may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters
that affect his probationary status; such a requirement, without more, does not
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give rise to a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the questions
put to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for
answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution.
There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the state, either
expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to
revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the
failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer's answers
would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.

Mwphy, 465 U.S. at 435.
The Murphy Court also observed "that a state may validly insist on answers to even
incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it
recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus
eliminates the threat of incrimination."

Id. at 435 n.7.

"Under such circumstances, a

probationer's right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be at stake."

Id. Further, "nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a State from revoking probation
for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of probation or from using the
probationer's silence as one of a number of factors to be considered by a finder of fact in
deciding whether other conditions of probation have been violated." Id.
In Murphy, the Court inquired into whether the probationer's conditions of probation
"merely required him to appear and give testimony about matters relevant to his probationary
status or whether they went farther and required him to choose between making incriminating
statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent." Id. at 436. The Court
held, "there is no reasonable basis for concluding that Minnesota attempted to attach an
impermissible penalty to the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 437.
The Court based its holding on the following: "There is no direct evidence that Murphy
confessed because he feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained silent. . . .
Murphy was not expressly informed during the crucial meeting with his probation officer that an

17

assertion of the privilege would result in the imposition of a penalty." Id. at 437-38. Further,
"the fact that Murphy apparently felt no compunction about adamantly denying the false
imprisonment charge on which he had been convicted before admitting to the rape and murder
strongly suggests that the 'threat' of revocation did not overwhelm his resistance." Id. at 438.
The Murphy Court also held that if the probationer "did harbor a belief that his probation
might be revoked for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege, that belief would not have been
reasonable," because the State "could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation
for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. Additionally, revocation was
not automatic under Minnesota's statutes, even if the probation officer desired revocation,
because a court would have the final say following a hearing. See id. at 438-39. Thus, the

Murphy Court could not "conclude that Murphy was deterred from claiming the privilege by a
reasonably perceived threat ofrevocation." Id. at 439.
Conversely, in this case, Mr. Forbes was deterred from claiming the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination by a reasonably perceived threat of revocation.
The district court determined that Officer Blettner "did no more than arrange for the polygraph at
the request of law enforcement, arrange for Defendant to get a ride to that appointment, and then
accurately answer Defendant's questions about the polygraph." (R., p.629.) The district court
also determined Officer Blettner "did not order Defendant to submit to the polygraph, nor did he
threaten him with a sanction if Defendant refused." (R., p.629.)
However, the district court also found that Officer Blettner "said he told Defendant if he
told Defendant to take a polygraph examination that Defendant would have to do so since he was
on felony probation and a condition of that probation included taking polygraph examinations."

(R., pp.622-23.) Thus, unlike the probation officer in Murphy, who wanted to discuss the
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probationer's information in terms of his continued need for treatment, Officer Blettner did not
couch the requirement to take a polygraph in terms of treatment or other matters relevant to
Mr. Forbes' probationary status. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 423-24.
Further, the district court here found that Mr. Hemming, a facilitator at the Good
Samaritan program, "believed Defendant had been ordered by his probation officer to take the
polygraph examination, and told Defendant of his belief." (R., p.623.) Thus, Mr. Forbes
submits that there is more direct evidence here, than was the case with the probationer in
Murphy, that Mr. Forbes made his incriminating statements because he feared his probation

would be revoked if he remained silent. Cf Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437-38.
Mr. Forbes was therefore placed in a "classic penalty" situation, where his assertion of
the Fifth Amendment privilege was penalized so as to foreclose a free choice to remain silent,
and compel incriminating testimony. See id. at 434-35; Garner, 424 U.S. at 661. Thus, his
incriminating statements to Mr. Pulver and Detective Beck were made in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. The district court erred when it denied
Mr. Forbes' motion to suppress on the Fifth Amendment privilege issue.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Forbes' Motion To Dismiss The
Indictment

A.

Introduction
Mr. Forbes asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to

dismiss the indictment. The indictment should have been dismissed because the prosecutorial
misconduct in submitting illegal evidence to the grand jury was so egregious as to be prejudicial.
The prosecutor should not have presented to the grand jury Mr. Forbes' incriminating statements
made to Mr. Pulver and Detective Beck, and Ms. Carmack's testimony on Ms. Mason's prior
drug use was false. Thus, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards when it denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court reviews a denial of a motion to dismiss a grand jury indictment for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Bujanda-Velazquez, 129 Idaho 726, 728 ( 1997). When an appellate
court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, the sequence of inquiry requires
consider of whether the trial court:

(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;

(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 864 (2018).
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C.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct In Submitting Illegal Evidence Was So Egregious As To
Be Prejudicial, Because The Prosecutor Should Not Have Presented Mr. Forbes'
Incriminating Statements To The Grand Jury, And Ms. Carmack's Testimony Was False
Mr. Forbes asserts the indictment must be dismissed because the prosecutorial

misconduct in submitting illegal evidence was so egregious as to be prejudicial, because the
prosecutor should not have presented to the grand jury Mr. Forbes' incriminating statements
made to Mr. Pulver and Detective Beck, and Ms. Carmack's testimony on Ms. Mason's prior
drug use was false. The district court therefore did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards.
Idaho Criminal Rule 6.6 outlines the grounds for granting a motion to dismiss the
indictment, including when "the indictment was not properly found, endorsed and presented as
required by these rules or by the statutes of the state of Idaho." I.C.R. 6.6. A grand jury "ought
to find an indictment when all the evidence before them, taken together, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, would, in their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury." LC. § 19-1107.
Idaho Criminal Rule 6.5 provides: "If the grand jury finds, after evidence has been presented to
it, that an offense has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the accused
committed it, the jury ought to find an indictment." I.C.R. 6.5(a). "Probable cause exists when
the grand jury has before it evidence that would a reasonable person to believe an offense has
been committed and that the accused party has probably committed the offense." Id. The grand
jury "can receive any evidence that is given by witnesses produced and sworn before them
except as hereinafter provided, furnished by legal documentary evidence, the deposition of a
witness in the cases provided by this code or legally admissible hearsay." LC. § 19-1105.
An inquiry into the propriety of a grand jury proceeding is two-fold. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445, 448 (1994). As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, "First, we must determine
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whether, independent of any inadmissible evidence, the grand jury received legally sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause." Id (citing State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477
(1994); State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230 (1987)). "Second, even if such legally sufficient
evidence were presented, the indictment must be dismissed if the prosecutorial misconduct in
submitting illegal evidence was so egregious as to be prejudicial." Id. (citing Jones, 125 Idaho
477; Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 236-37). "Prejudicial effect" means "the defendant would not have

been indicted but for the misconduct." Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237. "Absent a showing a
prejudice by the defendant, we will not second guess the grand jury." Martinez, 125 Idaho
at 448.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held, "To determine whether misconduct gives rise to
a dismissal, an appellate court must balance the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct with
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the indictment." Id. at 448-49 (citing Edmonson, 113
Idaho at 23 7). The Court in Edmonson further explained this balancing:
At one extreme, the misconduct can be so outrageous that regardless of the extent
of probable cause evidence, dismissal will be required. At the other extreme, the
misconduct may be so slight, that it becomes unnecessary to question the
independent judgment of the grand jury. In the middle of these extremes, the
court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
indictment should be dismissed. As stated above, the burden rests with the
criminal defendant to make an initial showing that the misconduct rises to the
level of prejudice. Absent the showing of prejudice, a reviewing court will not
second guess the grand jury. However, once the defendant does affirmatively
prove prejudice, the court must dismiss.

Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237. "Generally, prosecutorial misconduct will require dismissal only
when it reaches the level of a constitutional due process violation." Id.
Here, even assuming the district court correctly detennined that legally sufficient
evidence supported the grand jury's finding of probable cause, the prosecutorial misconduct in
submitting illegal evidence was so egregious as to be prejudicial. Specifically, the prosecutor
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should not have presented to the grand jury Mr. Forbes' incriminating statements made to
Mr. Pulver and Detective Beck. The district court here determined "that the State did not violate
constitutional right to counsel and right to be free from compelled self incrimination in the
manner they obtained those statements. Therefore, there is no prejudice in the introduction of
that evidence to the grand jury." (R., p.641.) However, those incriminating statements were
actually made in violation of Mr. Forbes' Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from compelled
self-incrimination, for the reasons explained in Section I of the Argument above and
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
This use of the incriminating statements was prejudicial. As Mr. Forbes asserted before
the district court, "the prosecutor elicited testimony about those statements and the fruit of those
statements from Cynthia Carmack, Steven Hemming, and Detective David Beck of the Post Falls
Police." (See R., p.187 (citations omitted).) Indeed, Ms. Carmack testified before the grand jury
that Mr. Forbes "said he was interviewed with the polygraph person and that he also talked to the
detective that he had injected Cathryn." (Grand Jury Tr. 12/27/17, p.69, Ls.1-4 (Conf. Exs.,
p.33).) Mr. Hemming testified that Mr. Forbes "said that he was honest and truthful with the
detectives and in the polygraph. He said that his involvement was that he administered the drugs
to her. (Grand Jury Tr. 12/27/17, p.83, Ls.1-5 (Conf. Exs., p.37).) Detective Beck testified that,
at the police station, Mr. Forbes "said that he injected her with heroin[], that she overdosed, and
he-she shortly died thereafter." (Grand Jury Tr. 12/27/17, p.87, L.5 - p.88, L.13.) Thus, the
grand jury heard testimony from multiple witnesses on Mr. Forbes' incriminating statements,
where those statements were made in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Moreover, the testimony of Ms. Carmack on Ms. Mason's prior drug use was false. The
district court in this case observed that "Carmack's testimony was more problematical" than that

23

of Dr. Howard; "It appears to the Court that her testimony clearly implied her belief that Mason
was not a prior drug user, despite the fact that other evidence establishes that Carmack knew
otherwise." (R., p.641.) However, the district court determined: "It is entirely immaterial
whether Mason was a prior drug user. The grand jurors heard evidence that she was, and her
mother's implied belief that she was not. Neither inference matters." (R., p.641.)
Contrary to the district court's determination, Ms. Carmack's testimony was prejudicial.
As the district court acknowledged, Ms. Carmack before the grand jury testified that she did not
know Ms. Mason to do drugs. (See Grand Jury Tr. 12/27/17, p.61, L.15 - p.62, L.16 (Conf. Exs.,
p.31).) But as the district court found, "By the time of her Grand Jury testimony ... Carmack
had learned that Mason had been involved in illegal drug use." (R., p.635.) As Mr. Forbes
asserted before the district court, "There was a background, bit of information that was then
known, and that wasn't clarified to the grand jury." (See Tr. 08/03/18, p.59, Ls.10-12.) Rather,
"The State further allowed that picture to be painted of [C]athryn being quite innocent to this
lifestyle." (See Tr. 08/03/18, p.59, Ls.13-14.)
In sum, the prosecutor should not have presented to the grand jury Mr. Forbes'
incriminating statements made to Mr. Pulver and Detective Beck, and the testimony of
Ms. Carmack on Ms. Mason's prior drug use was false. Mr. Forbes submits that, balancing the
gravity and seriousness of the prosecutor's misconduct with the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the indictment, under the totality of the circumstances here, the misconduct here can
only give rise to a dismissal. See Martinez, 125 Idaho at448-49; Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237.
Because of the importance of Mr. Forbes' incriminating statements to the State's case, coupled
with Ms. Carmack's misleading portrayal of Ms. Mason's prior drug use, Mr. Forbes would not
have been indicted but for the prosecutorial misconduct. See Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 23 7.
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Thus, the prosecutorial misconduct in submitting illegal evidence was so egregious as to
be prejudicial, and the indictment must be dismissed. See Martinez, 125 Idaho at 448. The
district court therefore abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Forbes' motion to dismiss the
indictment, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.

See

Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 864.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Forbes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court's order of judgment and commitment, the order denying his motion to suppress, and the
order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2019.
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